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THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY'S ROLE IN
PROMOTING THE RIGHT TO DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE AND FREE CHOICE
IN THE THIRD WORLD
Ndiva Kofele-Kale *
I. INTRODUCTION
HIS inquiry seeks to provide answers to two nagging questions on
the responsibility of the community of nations in the promotion
and defense of the universalist aspirations of the International Bill
of Rights. When, it asks, is it right for the global community to intervene
in the internal affairs of sovereign states to stop human rights abuses?
And, as a follow up, should such intervention have as its ultimate goal
that of replacing the government responsible for these violations? These
questions have been provoked in part by the current debate over the le-
gality and legitimacy of the use of force to effect a change in regime. But
they are also in response to a perceived reluctance by the community of
nations to intervene in the internal affairs of states to halt domestic viola-
tions of the right to democratic governance. Both the legal and norma-
tive factors that have contributed to this perceived unwillingness to take
affirmative steps to expand the values of democratic governance beyond
their Euro-American confines1 will be explored in this essay.
The obligation to intervene to protect the democratic entitlement puts
in conflict two competing community expectations: on the one hand, the
expectation that human rights, including the right to democratic govern-
ance, will be universally promoted and protected pursuant to the United
*Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law. Ph.D.,
J.D. (Northwestern). The research assistance of Catherine Bamugemereire, LL.B.
(Makerere), LL.M. (SMU 2003) and the research support from a 2003 Summer
Research Grant are gratefully acknowledged. This paper grew out of remarks
made at an international conference organized at, and chaired by Dean John At-
tanasio of, the SMU Dedman School of Law in April 2002 under the title: "Re-
sponding to Global Threats: The Cases for Unilateralism and Multilateralism." A
revised version, "An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Global Community Response
in Defense of Domestic Abuses of the Right to Freedom of Choice in Sub-Saharan
Africa," was delivered at the Lunchtime Lecture Series on "Images of Human
Rights," at the University of Tennessee College of Law, Knoxville, Tennessee,
Monday, April 21, 2003. I am grateful to Dean Thomas Galligan of the College of
Law and Professor Rosalind I.J. Hackett of the Department of Religious Studies
for making possible my participation at the lecture series.
1. See Marc M. Boutin, Somalia: The Legality of U.N. Forcible Humanitarian Inter-
vention, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 138 (1994).
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Nations Charter (the Charter) article 1(3)2 and, on the other hand, the
conviction that member states are free to conduct their domestic affairs
without any outside interference. This doctrine of non-intervention is to
international law what the Hippocratic Oath is to medicine. Entrenched
in articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the Charter, this first commandment of inter-
national law prohibits states from interfering with the sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity, and political independence of other states.3 The only
derogation allowed is by way of a Security Council authorized collective
action in response to breaches of international law that threaten interna-
tional peace and security. 4
The interplay between articles 1(2), 2(4), 2(7), and 39 gives rise to a
number of questions. First, when does the doctrine of non-intervention
yield to the international responsibility to promote and encourage respect
for human rights, specifically the right to democratic governance? Sec-
ond, at what point do domestic human rights abuses pose a threat to in-
ternational peace, justifying a response from the community of nations
that could ultimately lead to a regime change? Should one of these rights
be preserved at the expense of the other? If so, which one? Following
current practice, the answer to the first question is clear: non-intervention
will yield only to violations of human rights that threaten international
peace and security. As to the second question, that is, at what point vio-
lations of the right to democratic governance rise to the level of a threat
to global peace and security, the answer hinges on the interpretation of
the "threat to [international] peace and security" clause of article 39 of
the Charter.5 This author of this paper would like to see this order re-
versed, so that where fundamental rights are in danger, the doctrine of
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states should yield
to a global community obligation to intervene in order to protect these
rights. This would require a reinterpretation of the "threat to the peace"
clause in article 39. As will be demonstrated, the traditional interpreta-
tion of the "threat to the peace" clause has provided the community of
nations with a ready and convenient excuse to shirk its duty to check
domestic violations of the democratic entitlement in Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA). A change in this approach is now necessary as the assaults on the
right to democratic choice in this region of the world are quickly becom-
ing the norm rather than the exception.
A. SOME DEFINITIONS
By the right to "democratic governance," I mean the freedom to
choose one's leaders through a democratic process: the right to change a
government through free, fair, and transparent elections, with universal
suffrage and secret ballot. Some have called this the democratic entitle-
2. U.N. Charter art. 1, para 3.
3. Id. art. 2, para. 4, 7.
4. Id. art. 39.
5. Id.
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ment; however, in this essay, it will be used as a synonym for democratic
governance. I view the electoral process as the only way a people can
express its will and on which the legitimacy of a government is based.
"Global community" refers to the community of nations or, more pre-
cisely, the members of the United Nations (U.N.). By "global community
responsibility," I mean the legal obligation of the global community in
promoting and defending the right to democratic governance, even if this
requires the use of force, where necessary, to effect a regime change. 6
In the context of this inquiry, regime change will mean change in one
of two directions: either (1) to restore constitutional and democratic or-
der in the wake of the overthrow of a democratically elected government
by a military coup d'etat,7 or (2) to remove an incumbent regime that is
blocking a democratically elected successor from taking over.8 Under
this scheme, countries ripe for regime change are limited to those where
the opportunity to exercise the right of choice is offered and accepted
only to have it brusquely taken back. The focus of this paper is SSA
where "[a] decade of democratization has resulted in disappointing re-
sults and unfulfilled expectations, frustrating the democratic promise of
6. That is, interventionist action along a wide continuum from the most pacific to the
most coercive. At one end of the spectrum is diplomatic isolation, denial of visa
privileges to high ranking state officials and their relatives, withdrawal of air land-
ing rights, denying an offending state loans, denying a country most favored nation
(MFN) status, removing it from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP),
cutting off foreign aid and freezing assets, and imposing trade embargo (exempting
humanitarian supplies). At the other end of the continuum is the use of coercive
measures including military intervention to effect change. See U.N. Charter arts.
41-42.
7. In Sir Dawda Jawara v. The Gambia, Afr. Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights
2000, Comm. Nos. 147/95 & 149/96 (2000), 1999-2000 Afr. Ann. Act. Rep., Annex
V, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights was seized with a com-
plaint filed by the former Head of State of the Republic of The Gambia alleging
numerous violations of the rights contained in the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights. The Commission concluded that the military coup that overthrew
the government of Sir Dawda "was a grave violation of the right of the Gambian
people to freely choose their government as entrenched in Article 20(1) of the
Charter," at page 107. In addition to military overthrow of Jawara in The Gambia;
there are also several other African examples where a democratically elected gov-
ernment was forcibly replaced by a military junta: the case of Tejan Kabbah of
Sierra Leone and Lissouba's overthrow by Sassou Nguesso in Congo-Brazzaville.
8. In Algeria, the leaders and supporters of the Islamic fundamentalist party, le Front
islamique du salut, not only watched as their imminent victory at the polls was
aborted by the military in December 1991 but also had to contend with the outlaw-
ing of their party from the Algerian political scene. In the 1993 Nigerian presiden-
tial elections, the declared winner, Moshood Abiola, was not allowed to take office
by the military government headed by General Ibrahim Babangida; instead, Abi-
ola was sent to jail where he subsequently died. Later, in the March 2002
Zimbabwe presidential election, the incumbent President, Robert Mugabe, used
the control he enjoyed over the electoral system, the courts, media, army, and
police to prevent Zimbabwean voters in general and supporters of his main rival,
Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change, from exercising
their right to elect a president of their choice. See REPORT OF THE SouTH AFRI-
CAN PARLIAMENTARY OBSERVER MISSION: ZIMBABWE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION,
Mar. 9-11, 2002, available at http://www.gov.za/issues/zimreport.html.
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peace and development." 9 One might also add that it is also in this re-
gion where global community response to domestic abuses to the demo-
cratic entitlement is most needed but where, regrettably, its absence is so
glaringly noticeable.
If we accept (and I do) the indivisibility and universality of human
rights, then the right to democratic governance is an entitlement available
to the peoples of Africa as it is to the peoples of Europe and the United
States. If so, then this fundamental right is deserving of global commu-
nity protection. In fact, the international community has an affirmative
duty to intervene to restore or install democratically elected government
for a couple of reasons. First, international law places the primary re-
sponsibility for enforcing internationally accepted human rights norms on
the community of nations, which was freely assumed by the global com-
munity when it adopted the International Bill of Rights several decades
ago. As a consequence, failure to enforce respect for the democratic enti-
tlement runs the risk of reducing it to a right without a legal remedy. The
Roman law maxim, ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a legal right,
there is also a legal remedy) 10 applies. Second, the universality of human
rights1' and the elevation of a select few to the level of jus cogensl2 have
imposed on the community of nations an obligation erga omnes13 to re-
9. See AUGUSTIN LOADA & CARLOS SANTISO, LANDMARK ELECTIONS IN BURKINA
FASO: TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC MATURITY? 1, 2 (Int'l IDEA's Burkina Faso Pro-
ject), available at http://archive.idea.int/burkina/policy-brief.pdf.
10. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (citing Blackstone Commentaries 23).
11. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was adopted by the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly in 1948 (by an affirmative vote of 49 states, with no state voting
against and 8 states abstaining) proclaims in its preamble that this Declaration is
intended to serve as the "common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations" and exhorts "every individual and every organ of society... [to] strive by
teaching and education to promote respect for [the rights and freedoms contained
in the Declaration] and by progressive measures, national and international, to
secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the
peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under
their jurisdiction." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at
71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (empha-
sis added).
12. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines jus cogens as
"a peremptory norm of general international law ... accepted and recognized by
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no deroga-
tion is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character." See Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties art. 53, Apr. 24, 1970, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force, Jan. 27,
1980 but not ratified by the United States) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Ex-
amples of jus cogens norms would include: genocide, torture, crimes against hu-
manity, war crimes, the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, and the right to self-
determination.
13. The concept of obligations erga omnes (an obligation towards all) was framed by
the ICJ by way of an obiter dictum in its judgment in the Barcelona Traction Case.
The Court wrote that "an essential distinction should be drawn between the obli-
gations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those aris-
ing vis-A-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very
nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the
rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they
are obligations erga omnes." Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (BeIg.
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spond affirmatively to violations of these rights wherever and whenever
they occur.' 4
It will be argued in this paper that the global community has been ex-
tremely reluctant to intervene to halt domestic violations of the right to
democratic governance. This reluctance can be explained in part by the
narrow definition given to the "threat to the peace and security" clause of
article 39 of the Charter. 15 It is the thesis of this paper that the interna-
tional legal definition of what constitutes a threat to international peace
should be expanded, for several reasons. First, the narrow definition re-
flects a Eurocentric historical paradigm that defined threats to interna-
tional peace as only those that are global in scope to the exclusion of
threats that are localized in nature. Since the Charter was adopted fifty
years ago, much has changed to justify an expansion of international
threats to peace to include both threats with worldwide ramifications as
well as those that are basically local but with far-reaching consequences.
Second, any treaty that has been around for as long as the Charter is
affected by the passage of time, which can "change the language and
meaning of words."' 16 As a consequence, ascribing a meaning to words in
that instrument will depend on whether the interpretation is based on the
time of the conclusion or the time the instrument is being interpreted. 17
B. OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY
With the preceding as backdrop, I intend to proceed with this inquiry in
two stages: first, to situate the right to democratic choice/governance in
international law and to make a case for global community protection of
that right; next, to explore the doctrinal problems associated with con-
struing the "threat to [international] peace" clause in articles 1 and 39 of
the Charter, the yardstick against which decisions on whether the global
community can intervene or not in the domestic affairs of states are mea-
sured; and finally, to discuss briefly some normative considerations that
have provided a convenient cover for a global community that has been
reluctant to intervene to restore and install democratic governments.
v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5) (emphasis added). The Court then went on to
cite several examples of obligations of an erga omnes character: "[s]uch obligations
derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts
of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the
basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial dis-
crimination." Id.
14. This erga omnes duty to respond in the internal affairs of states has been exercised
in the following instances: India's intervention in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh,
in 1971; Tanzania's intervention in Uganda in 1978-79; the U.S. intervention in
Grenada in 1983, in Nicaragua in the mid-1980s, in the Panama in 1989, in Iraq in
1991, and in Haiti in 1994. Douglas Eisner, Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-
Cold War Era, 11 B.U. INT'L L. J. 195 (1993).
15. U.N. Charter art. 13.
16. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 23 (Bruno Simma ed.,
Oxford University Press 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter Simma].
17. Id.
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II. THE RIGHT TO DEMOCRATIC CHOICE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The right of a people to elect a government of their choice is a funda-
mental right recognized in numerous international and regional instru-
ments. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the fountain of all
subsequent human rights instruments, provides:
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of govern-
ment; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections
which shall be universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by se-
cret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 8
Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
also recognizes the importance of elections as the means for building a
democratic government:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity . . . (a) [t]o
take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely
chosen representatives; (b) [t]o vote and to be elected at genuine
periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and
shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the
will of the electors. 19
With the exception of the European Convention on Human Rights,20
virtually all the extant regional human rights instruments provide for the
right to free and fair elections as the sine qua non of participatory democ-
racy. Article XX of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man states: "Every person having legal capacity is entitled to partici-
pate in the government of his country, directly or through his representa-
tives, and to take part in popular elections, which shall be by secret ballot,
and shall be honest, periodic and free."''z
Similar language is contained in the 1969 American Convention on
Human Rights which provides in its article 23: "Every citizen shall enjoy
the [right] . . . [t]o vote and be elected in genuine periodic elections,
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that
guarantees the free expression of the will of the voters. '22 And the more
recent African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights recognizes the
right of every citizen "to participate freely in the government of his coun-
try, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance
with the provisions of the law,"'23 while providing that "[a]ll peoples shall
18. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 11, at art. 21.
19. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
20. European Parliament, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparlllibe/elsj/charter/artOl/defaulten.
htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2006).
21. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Res.
XXX, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992).
22. American Convention on Human Rights art. 23, Nov. 22, 1969, 1114 U.N.T.S. 123.
23. African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 13, June 27, 1981,
O.A.U. Doc. CABILEG/67/3 rev. 5.
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... freely determine their political status... according to the policy they
have freely chosen." 24
International commitment to democratic governance has also been ex-
pressed in General Assembly Resolution 45/150, which strongly affirms
the conviction of U.N. members:
[Tihat periodic and genuine elections are a necessary and indispensa-
ble element of sustained efforts to protect the rights and interests of
the governed and that, as a matter of practical experience, the right
of everyone to take part in the government of his or her country is a
crucial factor in the effective enjoyment by all of a wide range of
other human rights and fundamental freedoms, embracing political,
economic, social and cultural rights. 25
A. INGREDIENTS OF FREE, FAIR, AND TRANSPARENT ELECTIONS
In addition to the articulation of principles, there is also wide agree-
ment on the criteria that define a free and fair election. These have been
summarized by Gregory Fox as: (1) periodic elections at reasonable inter-
vals; (2) a secret ballot; (3) honesty in vote tabulation; (4) universal suf-
frage, with minor exceptions permitted-minors, prisoners, the mentally
ill, and the like; (5) an absence of discrimination against voters and candi-
dates; (6) freedom to organize and join political parties, which must be
given equal access to the ballot, and an equal opportunity to campaign;
(7) to the extent the government controls the media, the right of all par-
ties to present their views through the major media outlets; and (8) super-
vision of the election by an independent council or commission not tied
to any party, faction, or individual, whose impartiality is insured in both
law and practice.2 6
From the foregoing discussion, it is submitted that treaty law recognizes
free, fair, and transparent elections with universal suffrage and secret bal-
loting as the means by which a people can express its will and on which
the legitimacy of a government is based. It is imperative therefore that
means be made available to the people through which they can vindicate
this legal right if it is to mean anything-ubi jus ibi remedium. This rule
was framed in the context of fundamental rights in Marbury v. Madison:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury .... "[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that
where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or
action at law, whenever that right is invaded. '27
24. Id. art. 20, T 1.
25. G.A. Res. 45/150, U.N. GAOR, 69th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/150 (Dec.
18,1990).
26. See Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17
YALE J. INT'L L. 539 (1992).
27. Marbury, supra note 10, at 163.
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It is to these international human rights instruments that we must look
for the means to enforce violations of human rights norms. These instru-
ments uniformly place the primary responsibility for enforcing interna-
tionally accepted human rights norms on the community of nations.28 It
follows therefore that this community cannot routinely ignore widespread
and repeated violations of the peoples' right to elect leaders of their
choice in free elections without running the risk of diluting this treaty-
protected right and transforming it into a legal right without a legal rem-
edy. Unfortunately, contemporary discussion of this right has tended to
focus on situations where there has been a "usurpation of the sovereign
prerogative of a population to be governed by those it has democratically
elected, '29 meaning forcible change of government. As a result, calls for
democratic restoration, that is, international response to violations of the
right to democracy, have been limited to measures designed to restore
democratically elected governments that fall victim to military coups. 30
On the other hand, efforts directed at the removal of repressive and au-
thoritarian governments have been few and far between.
W. Michael Reisman has rightly observed that "[m]ilitary coups are
terrible violations of the political rights of all the members of the collec-
tivity, and they invariably bring in their wake the violation of all the other
rights. ' 31 Indeed, the very idea of military participation in civil politics,
leaving aside for the moment how this involvement comes about, offends
both the letter and spirit of democratic governance. When this involve-
ment is secured through the violent overthrow of a popularly elected gov-
ernment, it undermines the participatory rights that constitute the
democratic prerogative.
28. The Members of the United Nations have pledged themselves to jointly and sever-
ally take action to promote the "universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, lan-
guage or religion." U.N. Charter arts. 55, 56.
29. See Lois E. Fielding, Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human
Rights: The Emerging Right of Humanitarian Assistance to Restore Democracy, 5
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 329, 330 (1995) (arguing that the overthrow of a demo-
cratic government can constitute a threat to peace and security under article 39 of
the Charter and that support for this emerging right of humanitarian assistance to
restore democracy is found in various U.N. documents, declarations, and
resolutions).
30. Examples would include the U.S. intervention in Haiti under U.N. authorization
or the ECOWAS (Economic Community for West Africa) interventions in Liberia
and Sierra Leone. See e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and
Fledgling Democracies, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 794, 795 (1995) (support for demo-
cratic governments that find themselves imperiled by violent domestic anti-demo-
cratic forces). President Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone was overthrown in a coup
on 25 May 1997, forcing him into exile in neighboring Guinea. Kabbah was eventu-
ally helped by the United States, Britain, and the Organization of African States to
get his presidency back, but while he was in Guinea, the United States and the
United Kingdom paid the expenses of Kabbah's government in exile. See Baffour
Ankomah, 'Chuck your bloody constitution in the dustbin,' - Jacques Chirac to Pas-
cal Lissouba, NEW AFRICAN, May 1998, available at http://www.africasia.com/new
african/index.php.
31. Reisman, supra note 30.
FREE CHOICE IN THE THIRD WORLD
The case of Gambia, which came up for review before the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Commission), is
illustrative. In 1994, a military (junta) seized power when it overthrew
the Jawara government. 32 Since independence in 1965, The Gambia had
always had a plurality of political parties participating in elections but this
tradition was brought to an abrupt halt by the military coup. In a pattern
that has been typical of military takeovers, the junta abolished the Bill of
Rights contained in the 1970 Gambia Constitution; ousted the compe-
tence of the courts to examine or question the validity of decrees pro-
nounced by the junta; banned political parties and Ministers of the former
civilian government from taking part in any political activity; and placed
restrictions on freedom of expression, movement, and religion on the ci-
vilian population. 33 Charging the junta with "hijacking" the democratic
process and for violating the Gambian peoples' right to "self-determina-
tion," the ousted President Jawara cited the military regime before the
African Commission in the matter of Sir Dawda Jawara v. The Gambia.34
In one its boldest decisions to date, made all the bolder because the Com-
mission is headquartered in Banjul in The Gambia, the Commission
found the military government in violation of the right of Gambian peo-
ple to exercise their right to democratic governance. It is true, the Com-
mission observed, that "the military regime came to power by force,
albeit, peacefully. This was not through the will of the people who have
known only the ballot box since independence, as a means of choosing
their political leaders. '35 This decision reaffirmed the importance of the
right to choose.
While the manner in which that right was withdrawn from the Gam-
bian people merits the condemnation it received from the African Com-
mission, there are other equally insidious means for violating popular
sovereignty that do not carry the high drama of a coup d'etat, nor for that
matter, arrest for long the attention of the global community. These in-
clude the deliberate and systematic violation by incumbent regimes of the
agreed rules of the game for electing a democratic government. The
democratic entitlement implies the right of the people to be able to re-
move repressive and authoritarian governments through constitutional
means. Free and fair elections are inextricably linked to the enjoyment of
the right to democratic governance. 36 Denial of this right was the central
issue in Sir Dawda Jawara v. The Gambia.37 The banning of political par-
ties and the obstructions placed on the peoples' right to choose their gov-
ernment are no different when promoted by a military regime or an
authoritarian civilian government. Nothing changes the fact that in either
type of government, flawed elections or no elections at all have the same




36. G.A. Res. 46/72, U.N. Doc. A/46/72/Add. 1 (Dec. 13, 1991).
37. Sir Dawda Jawara, supra note 7.
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practical effect on the civilian populations. A compromised electoral sys-
tem contributes to the obstruction of legitimate democracy in much the
same way as a violent overthrow of a popularly elected government.
Both deserve the same treatment from the community of nations.
B. EXTERNAL INTERVENTION TO PROTECT THE
RIGHT TO ELECT A GOVERNMENT
The right to vote out a government that is unresponsive, and/or to vote
in one that is responsive, to the peoples' democratic aspirations is a fun-
damental right entitled to global community protection. Some have ar-
gued that the right to pro-democratic intervention has not yet attained
the status of lex lata,38 while others submit that it at least qualifies as de
lege feranda.39 Some believe that this duty to promote democratic gov-
ernance, to the extent that it exists at all, should be advanced through
collective action bearing the imprimatur of the U.N. Security Council.40
Truly, it does not really matter what vehicle moves this right forward,
unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral, because: (1) not each case of abuse of
the democratic entitlement will invite the same type of external response,
and (2) the effectiveness and legitimacy of these responses may depend
on who is doing what and where.41
38. Tom J. Farer, An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW
AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 189 (Lori Fisler Damrosch &
David J. Scheffer eds., 1991). See also Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Dem-
ocratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645, 649-50 (1984) (who argues that pro-demo-
cratic invasions must be weighed against the dangerous consequences of
legitimizing armed attacks against peaceful governments).
39. See e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Intervention Against Illegitimate Regimes, in LAW AND
FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 159, 164 (Lori Fisler Damrosch &
David J. Scheffer eds., 1991) (arguing that intervention against gross domestic
human rights abuses already has become relatively normative in the system. What
is new is the idea that the system would include among those gross abuses trigger-
ing international concern those instances where governments deny their own
populations the right to participate democratically in the process of governance).
See also Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992) (submitting that representative democracy is gradually
evolving from moral prescription to an international legal obligation based in part
on customary law and in part on the collective interpretation of treaties); Ibrahim
J. Gassama, Safeguarding the Democratic Entitlement: A Proposal for United Na-
tions Involvement in National Politics, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 287 (1997); Fielding,
supra note 29; Fox, supra note 26, at 540-41.
40. Fielding, supra note 29, at 330. Lois Fielding takes the contrary view arguing that
the right of humanitarian assistance to restore democracy supports a unilateral
right of humanitarian intervention when the United Nations is not in a position to
act.
41. For instance, a unilateral intervention by France in an English-speaking West Afri-
can State may be resented while a similar response from the Nordic countries may
provoke the opposite reaction. It is therefore important that the discourse on the
relative merits of unilateralism and multilateralism should focus on the approach
which, in a given context, can successfully advance this fundamental entitlement to
democracy. If in a given situation of domestic violation of the right to free choice,
a resolution which favors the right holders is obtained but only through the unilat-
eral involvement of a neighboring state or of a powerful distant one, then unilater-
alism is clearly the appropriate response. Other cases of such violations may merit
a collective response involving a coalition of nations or initiated by such powerful
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It has been insisted, and with some justification, that any form of exter-
nal involvement should be aimed at arresting a situation that threatens
international peace and security in conformity with the Charter's pre-
scriptions. Since the Charter's provisions regulating external intervention
in the domestic affairs of states represent the common will of the found-
ing members of the U.N., so this argument goes, then this will must be
given full effect. In response, this paper submits that, when in 1945 the
founding members spoke of threats to the peace and security, they had as
their point of reference their long experience with interstate conflicts that
produced two major world wars in the space of twenty-five years-the
First and Second World Wars.42
The conflicts of our time are, in the main, intrastate in nature though
with the potential for grave trans-boundary effects. 4 3 This new genre of
disputes occurs with remarkable frequency in regions of the world that
were not fully represented, nor whose interests were articulated during
the drafting of the Charter. Having now become bona fide members of
the U.N., it seems only fair and just that in construing the common will of
the parties to the Charter, account should be taken of their realities along
with those of the fifty or so mostly Euro-American States that met in San
Francisco to create the U.N. To do so would require a dynamic and func-
tional interpretation of the "threat to the peace and security" provisions
of the Charter.44 Only through such an approach will it be possible to
address domestic human rights abuses that can and do pose a threat to
world public order. An uncompromising reliance on the common will of
U.N. members, as expressed over a half century ago, in a world that has
radically and dramatically changed since that time, works against the pro-
gressive development of the law of nations in general and human rights
law in particular.
and influential global financial agencies like the Bretton Woods institutions. In the
latter instance, the effective multilateral response could well be lending conditions
imposed by the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank on the offending
state. External response as used here is not limited only to situations involving the
use of force but encompasses a wide range of responses on a continuum of varying
degrees of intrusion, such as the withdrawal of aid, the suspension of diplomatic
relations, economic sanctions, and so on. An external response that is backed by
force of the threat of it becomes an option only in the most extreme cases.
42. In the Preamble to the Charter, the peoples of the United Nations unequivocally
reaffirm their determination "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war, which twice in [their] lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind." U.N.
Charter pmbl. (emphasis added).
43. David Wippman acknowledges that almost any case of significant internal disorder
creates trans-boundary effects "to permit the Council to find a plausible threat to
the peace if it wishes to authorize intervention." But, it does not follow, he argues,
"that the Council will utilize its power to authorize intervention with any fre-
quency." See David Wippman, Defending Democracy Through Foreign Interven-
tion, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 659, 673 (1997).
44. Note, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 83, 93
(1993) (finds the Security Council's application of the term "threat to the peace"
to be "quite elastic").
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III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
EXTERNAL INTERVENTION
A useful starting point for any legal analysis of the right to intervene in
the domestic affairs of another state in defense of fundamental human
rights is the Charter of the U.N., the constitution of the world and the
highest instrument in the international hierarchy of international and do-
mestic documents on human rights. In the wake of the most massive and
systematic violations of human rights in modern history, the U.N. was
born. The Preamble to the Charter reaffirms "faith in fundamental
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal
rights of men and women."' 45 It goes on to declare the determination of
the peoples of the U.N. "to promote social progress and better standards
of life in larger freedom[s]. ' 46 Article 1, which speaks to the purposes
and principles of the U.N., includes in its paragraph 3, international coop-
eration "in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion."'47 This principle comes up again in article 55, paragraph
(c). 48 In article 13, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b), human rights are
listed among the responsibilities for study and recommendation of the
General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council.49 Article 68
authorizes the Economic and Social Council to set up commissions on
human rights while Chapters XI and XII, dealing with non-self-governing
territories and the international trusteeship system, also include numer-
ous human rights provisions.50 Finally in article 56, members pledge to
cooperate with the U.N. for the achievement of its human rights goals.5 '
Under this article, the enforcement of human rights is seen as a coopera-
tive effort with members working in concert with the U.N., not
unilaterally. 52
The drafters may have unwittingly set up a clash between the interna-
tional community's responsibility to promote and protect human rights
and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member
states. Where article 1 of the Charter acknowledges that a fundamental
purpose of the U.N. is the promotion and respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, article 2, paragraphs 4 and 7, make clear that
U.N. members must "refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations, ' 53 and:
45. U.N. Charter pmbl.
46. Id.
47. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
48. Id. art. 55, para. (c)
49. Id. art. 13, para. 1(b).
50. Id. art. 68.
51. Id. art 56.
52. Id.
53. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
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Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to sub-
mit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement mea-
sures under Chapter VII.54
Article 2, paragraphs 4 and 7 reflect the priority given to the principle
of state sovereignty by the drafters of the Charter. But the prohibition
against external intervention in matters that are domestic in nature does
not entirely foreclose such action. Chapter VII of the Charter outlines
the limited circumstances under which the U.N. may take action, forcible
or non-forcible, against a sovereign nation.55 The juxtaposition of articles
1(3) and 2(4) give rise to two inter-related questions. First, when does the
doctrine of non-intervention yield to the international responsibility to
promote and encourage respect for human rights? Second, at what point
do domestic human rights abuses pose a threat to international peace to
justify a response from the community of nations?
A. THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION
The doctrine of non-intervention is to international law what the Hip-
pocratic Oath is to medicine-first do no harm.56 Any discussion on ex-
ternal response to domestic human rights abuses must commence with
the principle of non-intervention-the norm from which any departure
has to be justified. It took a multinational effort spanning five continents
to bring an end to the barbarous Nazi regime, so it is not surprising that
the drafters of the Charter showed a strong preference for multilateral
over unilateral action in defense of the rights enshrined in the Charter.
The authority for collective intervention is granted by articles 39, 41,
and 42 of Chapter VII.57 Article 39 gives the Security Council the gen-
eral authority to take action when there is a threat to the peace:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accor-
dance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.58
Article 41 of Chapter VII governs the use of non-forcible collective
measures to ensure compliance with Security Council decisions:
54. Id. art. 2, para. 7.
55. Boutin, supra note 1, at 141.
56. INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTEcr: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION
AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 31, 4.12 (Dec. 2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT]; see
also Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131
(XX), U.N. Doc. AIRES/2131 (Jan. 14, 1966).
57. U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41, 42.
58. Id. art. 39.
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The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the
use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions,
and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply
such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption
of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio,
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations. 59
Finally, the authority to employ military force is granted in limited cir-
cumstances by Chapter VII, article 42:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary
to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action
may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air,
sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. 60
Article 42 is invoked only in response to crisis situations that threaten
"international peace and security. '' 61 This language has been used to jus-
tify U.N. collective actions in defense of human rights. 62
B. THE PROBLEM WITH THE LANGUAGE OF INTERVENTION
Strong reservations continue to be registered over the use of the term
humanitarian intervention in human rights abuse situations. After an ex-
haustive study of external reactions to domestic human rights violations,
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (the
Commission) 63 came to the conclusion that the expression humanitarian
intervention is not particularly helpful in carrying forward the debate for
or against the right to intervene and proposed instead the term responsi-
bility to protect.64 The Commission justifies this change in nomenclature
59. Id. art. 41.
60. Id. art. 42.
61. Id.
62. Ravi Mahalingam, The Compatibility of the Principle of Nonintervention With the
Right of Humanitarian Intervention, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 221, 245
(1996).
63. This cross-national independent body was set up in September 2000 by the Cana-
dian Government in response to a statement made by the U.N. Secretary-General
challenging the international community to try to build consensus around the basic
questions of principle and process with respect to the so-called right to humanita-
rian intervention. The Commission's mandate was "to promote a comprehensive
global debate on the relationship between intervention and state sovereignty." Af-
ter twelve months of intensive research, worldwide consultations and deliberation,
the Commission issued its report. Int'l Comm'n on Intervention and State Sover-
eignty, About the Commission, Mandate and Organization of the Commission,
http://www.iciss.ca/mandate-en.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
64. ICISS REPORT, supra note 56, at 2.4. The traditional language's preoccupation
with the right of humanitarian intervention or the right to intervene was found
unhelpful for three reasons:
First, it necessarily focuses attention on the claims, rights and prerogatives of the
potentially intervening states much more so than on the urgent needs of the poten-
tial beneficiaries of the action. Secondly, by focusing narrowly on the act of inter-
vention, the traditional language does not adequately take into account the need
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because it refocuses "attention where it should be most concentrated, on
the human needs of those seeking protection or assistance. '65
In a similar vein, in this essay the term responsibility to respond is pre-
ferred over the term the right to intervene because the former properly
focuses attention where it should be-on those who are on the receiving
end of human rights abuses. They are the ones best placed to assess the
effectiveness of external responses to their plight. As Jean-Jacques Rous-
seau is reputed to have observed, the view of the tree from the branches
is quite different from its roots. So to the effectiveness of international
response to human rights abuses is likely to elicit different reactions from
the victims and their external rescuers. While the latter might get bogged
down over the legality of their right to intervene, the victims for their part
worry about the nature and effectiveness of international responses.
This discussion will treat external responses on a continuum of varying
degrees of involvement, with military intervention at one extreme and
mere condemnation at the other.66 U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan,
has underscored the importance of defining external responses to domes-
tic violations of human rights "as broadly as possible, to include actions
along a wide continuum from the most pacific to the most coercive. '67
Responses would include, in ascending order of gravity: diplomatic isola-
tion, denial of visa privileges to high-ranking State officials and their rela-
tives, withdrawing air landing rights, denying it loans, denying MFN
status, removing the country from the General System of Preferences,
cutting off foreign aid and freezing assets, imposing a trade embargo (ex-
empting humanitarian supplies), and military intervention. 68
IV. THE MEANING OF THE "THREAT TO THE PEACE AND
SECURITY" CLAUSE IN THE CHARTER
A. ARTICLE 39 IN PERSPECTIVE
The language of threat to peace is found in article 39 of the Charter
which reads:
for either prior reventive effort or subsequent follow-up assistance, both of which
have been too often neglected in practice. And thirdly, although this point should
not be overstated, the familiar language does effectively operate to trump sover-
eignty with intervention at the outset of the debate: it loads the dice in favour of
intervention before the argument has even begun, by tending to label and delegi-
timize dissent as anti-humanitarian.
Id. 2.28.
65. Id. 1 2.22.
66. See John C. Pierce, Note, The Haitian Crisis and the Future of Collective Enforce-
ment of Democratic Governance, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus 477, 482 (1996).
67. Press Release, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General Assem-
bly, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7136 GA/9596, Sept. 20, 1999 [hereinafter 1999 Annual
Report].
68. See also Harold Hongju Koh, Democracy and Human Rights in the United States
Foreign Policy?: Lessons from the Haitian Crisis, 48 SMU L. REV. 189, 196-97
(1994).
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The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accor-
dance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.69
Article 39 has been described as "the single most important provision
of the Charter"70 for two principal reasons. First, it backs up the most
important goal of the U.N.: the maintenance of international peace and
security.71 As such, when peace is threatened, article 39 steps in to pro-
vide a mechanism for the global community to respond in kind. Second,
this article provides the only justification for the community of nations to
arrest this threat, even if it means derogating from the principle of non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of member states and even if such
intervention involves the use of force.
A major reason for the relative lack of global community attention to
the worldwide implantation of democratic governance can be attributed
to the conviction that the human rights abuses resulting thereof do not
have far-reaching trans-boundary effects. On the strength of this belief,
the "threat to the peace" clause of article 39 has been interpreted to ex-
clude from its scope the aftereffect of a flawed election. This interpreta-
tion does not conform to realities on the ground, where abuses of the
electoral system have been known to have spillover effects. It is there-
fore necessary to broaden the scope of article 39's "threat to the peace"
to make room for violations of the rights to political liberty found in al-
most every human rights instrument in force today.
1. The Scope of "Threat to the Peace" and "Breach of the Peace"
Before a decision to respond, unilaterally or collectively, in the internal
affairs of another state is taken, the Security Council must first deter-
mine, under article 39 of the Charter, whether there exists "any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. ' 72 It is critical to the
arguments advanced in this paper that some attempt is made to define or
identify the types of domestic human rights situations that meet the arti-
cle 39 threshold to justify derogation from the principle of non-interven-
tion. This process of identification depends a great deal on whether the
terms "threat to the peace" or "breach of the peace" are given a narrow
and restrictive interpretation or are read broadly. As a number of publi-
cists have noted, the phrases "threat to the peace" and "breach of the
peace" can take on a broad or narrow meaning, which allows for a highly
69. U.N. Charter art. 39.
70. See U.N. SECRETARY OF STATE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE RESULTS OF
THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE 90-91 (1945).
71. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
72. U.N. Charter art. 39.
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subjective interpretation. 73 It would appear that Charter practice has
been greatly influenced by the narrow construction of the article 39
threshold.
2. Vienna Convention Rules of Treaty Interpretation
Following the rules of treaty interpretation set forth in Section 3 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the general rule favors an
interpretation that accords "with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and pur-
pose."' 74 This is what is generally referred to as the textual method since
it lays stress on the text of a treaty as the best expression of the common
will of its parties. Article 1 of the Charter, which enumerates the object
and purpose of the U.N., lists as one of the Organization's main purposes
the maintenance of:
[I]nternational peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law, ad-
justment or settlement of international disputes or situations which
might lead to a breach of the peace.75
The operative word here is "international," which modifies the word
"peace." Given its ordinary meaning within the context of the avowed
goals of the Charter, the words "threat to the peace," as they appear in
the charge to the Security Council in article 39, would arguably be refer-
ring to situations that threaten international peace. The plain and ordi-
nary meaning of the word "international" is "existing or occurring
between nations," involving "all or many nations," or, in short, worldwide
in scope.76 Its use in articles 1 and 39 is in reference to a threat that is
global or worldwide in scale.
A textual interpretation must accept this as the expression of the origi-
nal will of the parties that adopted the Charter back in 1945. But what
should one make of threats to the peace that have transnational though
not worldwide effects. Should these be ruled out of the reach of article
39? It is submitted that to do so would unduly restrict the reach and
scope of the Charter. 77
73. Simma, supra note 16, at 720. See also Hans Kelsen, Collective Security and Collec-
tive Self-Defense under the Charter of the United Nations, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 783,
788 (1948).
74. Vienna Convention, supra note 12, at art. 31, 1.
75. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
76. Compact Oxford English Dictionary., International, http://www.askoxford.com
(last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
77. The Vienna Convention's treaty interpretation rules also provide that when the
"ordinary meaning," according to article 31, is "ambiguous or obscure" or is likely
to lead to a result that is "manifestly absurd or unreasonable" then recourse to
supplementary means of interpretation are permitted. Vienna Convention, supra
note 12, arts. 31-32. This subjective method, as a supplementary method of inter-
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3. The Narrow Interpretation
Under Charter practice, the terms "threat to the peace" and "breach of
the peace" have been narrowly construed to mean interstate conflicts.
Judge Bruno Simma, the general editor of an authoritative two-volume
commentary on the Charter, justifies this narrow construction on two
grounds.78 The first is that the Security Council's role was originally un-
derstood principally, "though not exclusively, with the prevention of in-
ter-state war," a goal which "corresponds with the fact that Art. 2(4)
prohibits the use of force only between, not within States."' 79 Further-
more, Simma argues, the first part of article 39 "does not refer to the use
of force in the internal realm of States .. . [thus] a civil war is not in itself
a breach of international peace, even though it might lead to such a
breach. '80 A more expansive view of the "threat to the peace" clause
seeks to include internal armed conflicts within its meaning even when
there is no prospect of an international war. Such a conflict must, how-
ever, offer "the prospect of a destabilization of the respective country, of
human rights violations and of dire humanitarian consequences,"' 8' rais-
ing the possibility of external intervention as was the case following the
break up of Yugoslavia. 82
Even when attempts have been made to incorporate grave violations of
human rights into the scope of article 39, the intention was not to include
"any severe violation of human rights."'83 Rather the focus has been only
those abuses occurring in the course of internal conflicts. This increasing
concern of the community of nations for the "internal order of States and
for the position of their citizens," 84 has led to a construction of the
"threat to [international] peace" clause to mean:
pretation, allows for the examination of preparatory works or recourse to the cir-
cumstances surrounding the adoption of the Charter as adequate means of getting
to the "common intention of [all the] parties." V. D. DEGAN, SOURCES OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 493 (1997). Following the subjective method of interpretation,
words used in a treaty have no meaning unless they express the common intention
of its parties at the time of its conclusion. The paternity of this rule of treaty
interpretation is usually traced to Grotius who rendered it in Latin as "In fide quid
senseris, non quid dixeris cogitandum" (In matter of promises more important is
the intention than the words used). Id. Reliance on this method is not all that
helpful because it is likely to lead to results that are manifestly absurd and unjust.
Such would be the case for ignoring the fact that systematic and deliberate efforts
to prevent a democratic government from coming into being have frequently pro-
duced effects that transcend national boundaries. See infra discussion on Norma-
tive Considerations.
78. Simma, supra note 16, at 720.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 721.
82. Id. at 723.
83. Id. at 725.
84. Id. at 721. In his review of post-1990 Charter practice that with respect to the
application of article 39 to internal conflicts, Simma concludes that the emphasis is
no longer the trans-border effects but on the internal situations as such. Id. at 724.
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(1) "gross and systematic violations . . .with grave humanitarian
consequences, '85
(2) "massive violations of humanitarian law or crimes against
humanity, 86
(3) "overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe[s], ' 87
(4) situations "of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, re-
quiring urgent relief,"'88
(5) violations which "genuinely 'shock the conscience of mankind,'" 89
(6) violations "which present such a clear and present danger to inter-
national security," 9 or
(7) serious breaches "on a widespread scale... [and] a consistent pat-
tern of gross violations." 91
Worse, this trend in broadening the scope of the "threat to the peace"
clause still excludes violations of democratic principles as constituting a
threat to international peace within the meaning of article 39.92 Even in
Haiti93 and Sierra Leone,94 where violations of democratic principles jus-
tified invoking this expansive interpretation of the language of article 39,
85. 1999 Annual Report, supra note 67.
86. Robin Cook, Foreign Secretary, Guiding Humanitarian Intervention, Address to




89. ICISS REPORT, supra note 56, at 4.13.
90. Id.
91. Louis Henkin, Human Rights and "Domestic Jurisdiction", in HUMAN RIGHTS, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORDS 22, 33 (Thomas Buergenthal ed.,
1977).
92. Simma, supra note 16, at 725.
93. S.C. Res. 841, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (June 16, 1993) (imposing a universal and
mandatory trade embargo on Haiti); S.C. Res. 917, U.N. Doc. S/RES/917 (May 6,
1994) (imposing stringent sanctions to compel the restoration of democracy and
the return of President Aristide, the legitimately elected president of Haiti); S.C.
Res. 940, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994) (authorizing a multinational force
under unified command and control to restore the legitimately elected President
and authorities of the Government of Haiti while extending the mandate of the
U.N. Mission in Haiti); Olivier Corten, La resolution 940 du Conseil de securite
autorisant une intervention militaire en Haiti: L'emergence d'un principe de legitim-
ite democratique en droit international?, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 116 (1995). See also
Simma, supra note 16, at 725.
94. S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (Oct. 8, 1997) (demanding the junta that
overthrew President Tejan Kabbah to immediately relinquish power in Sierra Le-
one and make way for the restoration of the democratically elected government
and a return to constitutional order); S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct.
22, 1999) (establishing the United Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to assist
inter alia the Government of Sierra Leone and the other parties (Revolutionary
United Front and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) to the Peace Agree-
ment in implementing the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration plan);
S.C. Res. 1289, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1289 (Feb. 7, 2000) (expanding the mandate of
UNAMSIL); S.C. Res. 1306, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306 (July 5, 2000) (placing a
worldwide ban on the importation of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone except
those controlled by the Government of Sierra Leone through the Certificate of
Origin).
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the internal situation had deteriorated to practically one of a civil war 95
before the community of nations responded.
External intervention was authorized in Haiti and Sierra Leone not so
much because of the violations of the democratic entitlement, but be-
cause these violations had created "a dangerous overall situation, in par-
ticular a severe destabilization of the countries, a degradation of the
humanitarian situation, and refugee flows." '96 These cases, therefore, do
not justify, in Simma's words, "the conclusion that the violation of demo-
cratic standards as such constitutes a threat to the peace. ' 97 This conclu-
sion is in line with current orthodoxy. Following the rules of treaty
interpretation prescribed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, articles 31 (textual) and 32 (subjective), this narrow construction can
be justified on two grounds.98 The first is that it reflects the common will
of the parties to the Charter at the time that instrument was adopted.
Second, it was never the intention of the founding members to confer on
domestic human rights violations the character and weight of a breach of
international law that poses a threat to international peace and stability.
A proponent of this restrictive interpretation goes as far as to claim that
nothing in the travaux preparatoires of the Charter suggests that the par-
ties envisioned a government's treatment of its own nationals as likely to
catalyze a threat or breach of peace within the meaning of article 39 and
related articles.99
Unfortunately, this approach views the Charter as static and not the
dynamic document that it truly is. One is reminded of Justice Holmes
oft-quoted statement on the protean character of law:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past. 1°°
95. As Simma points out, these violations of democratic principles in Haiti and Sierra
Leone were part of a "dangerous overall situation" marked by "a severe
destabilization of the countries, a degradation of the humanitarian situation, and
refugee flows." Simma, supra note 16, at 725.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. The textual approach requires the jurist to remain faithful to the text of the instru-
ment since it is the best expression of the common will of the parties. To this end,
the interpretation accord "with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." And unless
the parties to the instrument so intended, no special meaning should be given to a
treaty term. Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 31, 1.
The object and purpose of the United Nations are enumerated in article 1 of the
Charter and these include the maintenance of "international peace and security"
through collective measures. The operative word here is international, the adjec-
tive that modifies the word peace. A textualist would argue that when the drafters
talked about threats to international peace, they had in mind those threats that
were worldwide or global in scope, not threats that are localized in nature. U.N.
Charter art. 1, para. 1.
99. See Farer, supra note 38, at 190.
100. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
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It would be wrong to treat the provisions contained in the Charter as if
they are immune to change. The Charter has, in the last fifty years,
grown from a lowly acorn to the giant oak tree of today, sprouting
branches that extend into every conceivable corner of the globe. As one
of its leading scholars points out, the Charter is:
[L]ike any other statute or international treaty that has been con-
cluded for a long period of time, [and therefore] affected by the pas-
sage of time, which can change the language and meaning of words.
Thus, the answer to a question concerning the meaning of a word
may differ, depending on whether the answer is based on the mean-
ing of the term at the time of the conclusion of the treaty (static-
subjective interpretation based on the original will of the parties) or
on the linguistic usage of the term at the time of interpretation (dy-
namic-evolutionary, objective interpretation). 10 1
A contemporaneous interpretation of the provisions of this fundamen-
tal document must shy away from the narrow interpretation currently
given to article 39. Failure to do so would undermine the human rights
protections entrenched in the international instruments that followed on
the heels of the Charter. More importantly, this restrictive interpretation
has the effect of ruling out most cases of human rights abuses because of
the frightfully high threshold it sets for determining the kinds of human
rights violations that pose a threat to international peace.
It is true that the U.N. was formed when memories of the holocaust
were still fresh on the minds of its founding members. Their dogged de-
termination to avoid a repeat of the unspeakable assaults on human dig-
nity that characterized the Nazi regime is what gave this body its shape,
form, and content. It is most unlikely that those nations that came to-
gether to form this organization would have intended that the horrors of
the holocaust-one of the worst crimes against humanity in all of his-
tory-would serve as the yardstick against which to measure for all time
human rights violations that pose a threat to international peace. This
kind of descent by human beings into such barbaric depths, the pure evil
that was Hitler's Nazism, does not occur often in the history of mankind.
Using it as a measuring rod can be, at best, misleading.
4. Inherent Weakness of the Narrow Interpretation
The focus on the exceptional or extraordinary human rights situations
ignores the rarity of the events of the 1940s, although the killing fields of
Cambodia and the genocide in Rwanda and the Balkans urge some cau-
tion in coming to any sweeping conclusions. Be that as it may, this fixa-
tion with the extraordinary succeeds in leaving out a whole range of
domestic human rights abuses whose potential for threatening interna-
tional peace and security is equally as potent as the traditional types. The
international commitment to the universality of human rights is absolute
101. Simma, supra note 16, at 23.
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and cannot afford to be relativized. To avoid falling into this relativist
trap, the "threat to the peace" clause of article 39 must be given a reading
much broader than it currently enjoys. Such an expansive interpretation
would increase the kinds of domestic situations that pose a threat to in-
ternational peace. As a consequence, arguably internal matters, such as
the denial of democratic governance, would enter the mix.
There are several other problems with this narrow interpretation. For
one thing, the threshold for determining the kinds of human rights viola-
tions that pose a threat to international peace is deliberately set so high
that it excludes almost all types of human rights abuses except the most
egregious, that is, those that are universally judged as shocking to the
conscience of humanity (genocide, crimes against humanity). It is only
these jus cogens crimes that automatically trigger an obligatio erga
omnes.102 Second, a consequence, perhaps unintended, of this narrow in-
terpretation is that it freezes the Charter in time and place by ignoring
the revolutionary change in the membership of the U.N. since the Char-
ter was adopted in 1945. The U.N. today has close to 200 member states,
150 more than it had in 1945. Finally, a narrow interpretation downplays
the fact that the historical conditions that provide a backdrop against
which the language was drafted have also changed radically, such that we
are obliged to ask how the founding fathers of the U.N. would have
wanted these words construed in today's world. Some of the problems
the U.N. is now confronting were unforeseen at the time of its founda-
tion, such as (the use of) nuclear power, the field of nuclear arms, the
utilization of outer space and the sea bed, differing economic growth-
rates, the global environmental threat, and the dangers in the health
sector. 0 3
102. That was not the case when almost 800,000 Rwandans were slaughtered in the
space of six weeks while the global community stood, watched, and did nothing.
See Alain Destexhe, RWANDA AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(1995); ALISON DES FURGES, LEAVE NONE To TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN
RWANDA (Human Rights Watchl999). At the height of this carnage, the U.S. gov-
ernment was not even willing to admit that what was occurring in Rwanda met the
definition of genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention, preferring instead to
engage in semantic double-speak and "shameless evasions," as one writer saw it.
For example, the following colloquy between Christine Shelley, a State Depart-
ment spokeswoman, and the press corps during a routine briefing captures this
effort at obfuscation: "Q: So you say genocide happens when certain acts happen,
and you say that those acts have happened in Rwanda. So why can't you say that
genocide has happened? Ms. SHELLEY: Because, Alan, there is a reason for the
selection of words that we have made, and I have - perhaps I have - I'm not a
lawyer. I don't approach this from the international legal and scholarly point of
view. We try, best as we can, to accurately reflect a description in particularly
addressing that issue. It's - the issue is out there. People have obviously been
looking at it." See PHILIP GOUVREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM You THAT To-
MORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES 153 (1998).
103. Simma, supra note 16.
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B. THE TELEOLOGICAL/FUNCTIONAL INTERPRETATION
To overcome the limitations of the narrow interpretation of the "threat
to the peace and security" clause in article 39-interpretations which ex-
clude from their scope violations of the democratic entitlement-a third
approach, the teleological/functional approach, is proposed. This ap-
proach steps out of the text of the Charter to provide a functional inter-
pretation; one that makes good sense because it seeks to capture the
spirit of the Charter without, at the same time, offending the intent of its
framers. Where the narrow or restrictive interpretation emphasizes the
original will of the parties to the Charter at the time of its conclusion, the
teleological approach stresses the object and purpose of a treaty at the
time of its interpretation. The teleological approach, which looks to the
purpose of an overall scheme of the statute, owes its origins to the civil
law jurisdictions of Europe. The principle behind this approach was ex-
pressed by Lord Denning in Buchanan & Co. v. Babco Ltd.:
They adopt a method which they call in English by strange words -
at any rate they were strange to me - the "schematic and teleologi-
cal" method of interpretation. It is not really so alarming as it
sounds. All it means is that the judges do not go by the literal mean-
ing of the words or by the grammatical structure of the sentence.
They go by the design or purpose which lies behind it. When they
come upon a situation which is to their minds within the spirit - but
not the letter - of the legislation, they solve the problem by looking
at the design and purpose of the legislature - at the effect which it
was sought to achieve. They then interpret the legislation so as to
produce the desired effect. This means that they fill in gaps, quite
unashamedly, without hesitation. They ask simply: what is the sensi-
ble way of dealing with this situation so as to give effect to the pre-
sumed purpose of the legislation? 1°4
Similarly, in Henn & Derby v. DPP, Lord Diplock said:
The European Court, in contrast to English courts, applies teleologi-
cal rather than historical methods to the interpretation of the Trea-
ties and other Community legislation. It seeks to give effect to what
it conceives to be the spirit rather than the letter of the Treaties;
sometimes, indeed, to an English judge, it may seem to the exclusion
of the letter. It views the Communities as living and expanding orga-
nisms and the interpretation of the provisions of the Treaties as
changing to match their growth. 10 5
The appeal of the teleological approach lies in its capacity to override
or modify the rigidly literalist interpretation of the Charter favored by the
restrictive approach. This method of interpreting the Charter is man-
dated by the language of article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, which
provides that a treaty (such as the Charter) "shall be interpreted in good
104. James Buchanan & Co. v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping, Ltd., [1977] Q.B. 208,
213 (U.K.).
105. Henn & Darby v. DPP, [1981] A.C. 850, 905 (on appeal from Regina v. Henn).
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faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."'10 6
Several reasons have been advanced in favor of this method of interpret-
ing the provisions of the Charter and these will be discussed in the follow-
ing section of the paper.
C. DOCTRINAL SUPPORT FOR A TELEOLOGICAL APPROACH
TO INTERPRETING THE CHARTER
1. The Special Legal Position of the Charter
The U.N., among all international organization, it has been argued,
holds a special position as possibly the only organization with a truly uni-
versal membership. As a consequence, its founding treaty, the Charter,
also enjoys a special legal position in international law. According to
Judge Simma, the Charter is not structurally homogeneous, because it
encompasses both normative and contractual elements. 0 7 Therefore, dif-
ferent rules of interpretation are required to interpret the different parts
that make up the Charter. An evolutionary method of interpretation is
therefore recommended because it is oriented toward the purpose of the
organization.
2. The Framers Envisaged a Dynamic Method of Interpretation
The dynamic-evolutionary method of interpretation was already envis-
aged during the San Francisco Conference. The Commission Report IV/2
to the U.N. Foundation Conference of May 12, 1945, on the subject of
interpretation of the Charter reads as follows:
In the course of the operations from day to day of the various organs
of the Organization, it is inevitable that each organ will interpret
such parts of the Charter as are applicable to its particular functions.
This process is inherent in the functioning of anybody which operates
under an instrument defining its functions and powers. 10 8
This approach also finds support in the jurisprudence of international
tribunals and is favored in scholarly writings.
3. The Jurisprudence of the World Court
The teleological method of interpretation has been gaining ground in
the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (the ICJ) and this
movement has been gradual and deliberate. The approach was first ar-
ticulated in the 1949 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 0 9 where the court was asked to ad-
106. Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 31, 1.
107. Simma, supra note 16, at 15. See also HENRY G. SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONAL LAW 559 (2d ed. 1980); S. ROSENNE, Is the Constitution of an Inter-
national Organization an International Treaty?, 12 COMUN E STUD. 21 passim
(1966).
108. Simma, supra note 16, at 25.
109. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
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vise on whether the U.N. had the capacity to bring an international claim
in respect of damage caused to its agent against the state responsible for
his death or injury. The Court answered in the affirmative even though
the Charter does not expressly confer upon the organization such a ca-
pacity. 110 Then in 1950, Judge Alvarez, dissenting from the Case Con-
cerning the Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a
State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, argued:
[T]he interpretation of the San Francisco instruments will always
have to present a teleological character if they are to meet the re-
quirements of world peace, co-operation between men, individual
freedom and social progress. The Charter is a means and not an end.
To comply with its aims one must seek the methods of interpretation
most likely to serve the natural evolution of the needs of mankind.'11
This was a minority position as evidenced by the ICJ's decision in the
South-West Africa cases where the ICJ pointedly embraced a static-sub-
jective interpretation of the Charter based on the original will of the
founding members. 112
In 1966, the ICJ took the position that, when interpreting the Charter,
"[t]he Court must have regard to the situation as it was at that time,
which was the critical one, and to the intentions of those concerned as
they appear to have existed, or are reasonably to be inferred, in the light
of that situation."113 But in his dissent in the 1950 Case Concerning the
Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the
United Nations, Judge Alvarez took a different approach with respect to
the appropriate method for interpreting the Charter:
It is therefore necessary, when interpreting treaties-in particular, the
Charter of the United Nations-to look ahead, that is to have regard
to the new conditions, and not to look back, or have recourse to
travaux preparatoires. A treaty or a text that has once been estab-
lished acquires a life of its own. Consequently, in interpreting it we
must have regard to the exigencies of contemporary life, rather than
to the intentions of those who framed it .... [Ilt is possible, by way
of interpretation, to effect more or less important changes in treaties,
including the Charter of the United Nations.1' 4
The teleological position also picked up support from Judge Jessup's
dissent in the 1966 South-West Africa case, where he noted that "[t]he law
can never be oblivious to the changes in life, circumstance and commu-
110. See also Deumeland v. Germany, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 448 (1986) (European Conven-
tion should be construed "in the light of modern-day conditions obtaining in the
democratic societies of the Contracting States and not solely according to what
might be presumed to have been in the minds of the drafters of the Convention").
111. Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United
Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 23 (March 3) [hereinafter Admission of a State to the
United Nations].
112. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18, 1966).
113. Id. at 23.
114. Admission of a State to the United Nations, supra note 111, at 18 (dissenting opin-
ion of Judge Alvarez).
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nity standards in which it functions. Treaties-especially multipartite trea-
ties of a constitutional or legislative character-cannot have an absolutely
immutable character." 11 5
A decade later in its Advisory Opinion on Namibia, the ICJ shifted
ground and opted for a temporal reference point of interpretation when it
stated that:
[T]he concepts embodied in Article 22 of the covenant.., were not
static, but were by definition evolutionary .... [The ICJ's] interpre-
tation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent development of
law, through the Charter of the United Nations and by way of cus-
tomary law. Moreover, an international instrument has to be inter-
preted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system
prevailing at the time of the interpretation.1 16
This view is clearly expressed in an earlier concurring opinion by Judge
Alvarez where he noted "that an institution, once established, acquires a
life of its own, independent of the elements which have given birth to it,
and it must develop, not in accordance with the views of those who cre-
ated it, but in accordance with the requirements of international life." 117
Reviewing this three-decade long jurisprudence, Judge Simma con-
cludes that "the decisions of the ICJ . . . with regard to the temporal
reference-point," do not require the interpreter to follow rigidly "one or
the other of the rules; instead, it must be investigated whether the inten-
tions of the parties or the organizational purpose are better met by dy-
namic tendencies in the interpretation of terms or rather by a static
argumentation."' 18
4. The View of Scholars
The Charter, like most fundamental documents, is not frozen in time,
but is a living, dynamic document that is altered by the passage of time.
This is the view of one of the foremost commentators on the Charter:
Like any other statute or international treaty that has been con-
cluded for a long period of time ... [the Charter] is affected by the
passage of time, which affects the language and meaning of words.
Thus, the answer to a question concerning the meaning of a word
may differ, depending on whether the answer is based on the mean-
ing of the term at the time of the conclusion of the treaty (static-
objective interpretation based on the original will of the parties) or
on the linguistic usage of the term at the time of interpretation (dy-
namic-evolutionary, objective interpretation).' 19
115. South West Africa, supra note 112, at 439 (dissenting opinion of Judge Jessup).
116. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South African in
Nambia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 (June 21).
117. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, 1948
I.C.J. 57, 68 (May 28).
118. Simma, supra note 16, at 24.
119. Id. at 24.
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This method promotes the progressive development of international
law because it "calls for a solution even if there is no practice available
that could advocate such a change in the meaning of the word.' 120
D. ADVANTAGES OF THE TELEOLOGICAL METHOD
The teleological method of Charter interpretation is preferred over the
narrow/restrictive approach for a number of reasons. First, it takes into
account the fact that the Charter is an instrument of perpetual duration
and should not reflect only the common intention of the Euro-American
founding members of the U.N. as expressed over a half century ago, but
should also implicate the realities of a world that has radically and dra-
matically changed since its adoption. Second, the new threats to interna-
tional peace and security are intra-national in nature. They are no longer
those threats originally thought of when the Charter was drafted and de-
bated in the 1940s. Internal conflicts including those provoked by as-
saults on the right to democratic governance, broadly construed, have
now become potent threats to world peace. While they may fall short of
a threat that has worldwide reach, that such threats transcend the fron-
tiers of a single state cannot be denied. Nor can it be ignored that more
often than not the consequences from these threats touch quite a number
of neighboring states.
Finally, this approach allows the jurist to treat the Charter as a flexible
document that can be adapted, and is adaptable, to a changing world. It
also allows for interpretations of its provisions, especially those that im-
pact human rights, to keep pace with the natural evolution of the needs of
mankind, by, "adapting the Charter to the changing tasks by way of an
evolutionary dynamic interpretation." 121 This approach would permit the
Charter's provisions on human rights and fundamental freedoms to be
interpreted broadly, paving the way for the right of a people to elect its
government through free, fair, and transparent elections, and be accorded
heightened global community attention and protection.
V. NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
A. OTHER FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO
GLOBAL RELUCTANCE TO INTERVENE
While the major hurdle to pro-democratic intervention remains the
problem of doctrinal conservatism as regards the scope of the "threat to
the peace" clause in article 39 of the Charter, other factors of a normative
character have contributed to this status quo. Three will be discussed in
this section: (1) the problem of global fatigue, (2) the 'relativization' of
the right to democratic governance, and (3) the calculations of national
self-interest in deciding whether or not to intervene to protect the demo-
cratic entitlement.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 24.
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1. The Problem of Global Fatigue
One reason for the global community's noticeable lack of interest in
domestic violations of the right to free choice may have to do with the
problem of global fatigue. After a decade of democratization in SSA, the
results have been generally disappointing, and here one is being ex-
tremely charitable. Flawed elections in SSA (like official corruption)
have become almost a way of life in this part of the world to the point
where the international community has become jaded by the frequency of
their occurrence.1 22 With some qualified exceptions, few elections in Af-
rica in the last ten years have come anywhere close to meeting the mini-
mal international standards set for free and fair elections. Consider this:
in the last ten years few elections in Africa have come anywhere close to
meeting the minimum international standards for free and fair elec-
tions-of the 48 countries in SSA, only six have been able to organize
credible elections leading to a peaceful regime change (Senegal, South
Africa, Zambia, Tanzania, Ghana, and Kenya), perhaps seven if Nigeria is
added to this list. This is hardly a ringing endorsement for the implanta-
tion of democratic governance on the continent.
2. Democracy Is Not Suited for Africans
Related to the sense of ddjA vu discussed above is the patronizing view
of the democratic aspirations of the African people current in certain
Western circles. It is the notion that Africans are congenitally unsuited
for democratic governance and, if at all, only a tropicalized version of
democracy is good for them. This nauseating assessment of the demo-
cratic suitability of Africans was confirmed by French President Jacques
Chirac during a four-nation swing through francophone Africa in the
summer of 1999. During a stop in Conakry, Guinea, Chirac appealed to
the West to respect "the African rhythm" of democratization; an implicit
support for the slow pace of democratic reforms marked by persistent
electoral frauds. 123 Many Africans found Chirac's remarks an affront to
the continent, but they may very well explain France's reluctance to inter-
vene to put right flawed elections or its willingness to certify them to be
otherwise. The remarks also confirm a view that the international com-
122. There are notable exceptions to this catalog of flawed elections in country after
country in SSA. The recent May 2002 parliamentary elections in Burkina Faso
have been described as a breakthrough for democracy. These elections marked
the end of an era, as they ended the dominance of the ruling Congress for Democ-
racy and Progress (CDP), which has monopolized political power since the return
to multiparty democracy in that country in 1991. The May 2002 elections saw the
ruling CDP losing its crushing majority in the 111 seat National Assembly. CDP
saw its share of seats shrink from 101 to fifty seven while the opposition increased
its share from seven to fifty four. The May 2002 presidential elections in Mali also
saw the defeat of the candidate of the long-standing ruling ADEMA party and the
election of an opposition candidate Amadou Toumani Toure to the presidency.
See LOADA & SANTISO, supra note 9, at 2.
123. See Thomas Sancton/Lome, Aftermath of Empire, Aug. 16, 1999, http://www.time.
com/time/magazine/intl/article/,9171,29961-1,00.htm.
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munity merely pays lip service to basic principles of democratic govern-
ance in so far as this relates to the Third World. 124 Indeed, this
relativization of human rights contradicts the universalist aspirations of
the International Bill of Rights to which all nations and, by extension, all
peoples now subscribe.
3. External Involvement Only to Protect Strategic Interests
An African scholar has rightly observed that: "[tirue democracy is not
only about 'free and fair elections' that are certified to be so by the inter-
national election observers. Care should be exercised for elections not to
be used to certify bad leadership or promote the interests of foreign-
ers."'1 25 The truth is that elections in Africa have routinely been used to
validate repressive and autocratic governments because it fits in with the
realpolitik interest of certain members of the international community.
This much can be seen in the response to the Haitian crisis in the mid-
1990s, which offers a textbook example of an external involvement driven
by the intervening state's own agenda. The United States' involvement
was as much for altruistic humanitarian reasons as it was in pursuit of self
interest.
To begin with, the U.S. government harbored genuine fears about the
potential for an enormous influx of refugees to American shores 126 and
wanted to stem this tide, if at all possible. These fears were understanda-
ble as hundreds of Haitian "boat people" had been streaming to the
United States long before the military overthrow of the Aristide govern-
ment. It is also likely that U.S. support for the Haitian intervention had
much to do with American economic interests. The deliberate weakening
of the 1992 Organization of American States' trade embargo against Ha-
iti by allowing a series of exemptions for U.S. companies in the Haitian
assembly sector was done ostensibly on humanitarian grounds to relieve
the suffering of some 40,000 Haitian workers. Many observers saw
through this gesture "as a HOLLOW cover for a blatant concession to U.S.
business at the expense of an effective sanctions regime. ' 127 For Lori
Damrosch, by its action the U.S. government was pursuing its "self-inter-
est in flows of profits rather than of refugees. '1 28
124. For an exposition of this thesis, see Wippman, supra note 43, at 665 (dismissing
those who claim that international law recognizes a right to democracy that justi-
fies external intervention in its defense and arguing that there is as yet no broad
right of democratic intervention and rhetoric over its existence has outpaced
reality.)
125. See Wafula Okumu, Is it Democracy or Democrazy for Africa? (Reflections on
Elections in Zimbabwe, Congo and Madagascar), THE PERSPECTIVE, Mar. 19,
2002, at 3, http://www.theperspective.org/democrazy.html [hereinafter
Democrazy].
126. See Julie Ann Waterman, Note, The United States' Involvement in Haiti's Tragedy
and the Resolve to Restore Democracy, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 187,
213 (1994).
127. See Pierce, supra note 66, at 499.
128. See ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS
274, 306 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993).
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Of course, it would be naive to expect that when states respond to de-
fend domestic violations of human rights, it is always for altruistic rea-
sons, after all, "good international citizenship is a matter of national self-
interest. ' 129 Canada's International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty, which explored this issue at length, offers this sobering
conclusion on what motivates states to respond to domestic human rights
violations:
[T]he budgetary cost and risk to personnel involved in any military
action may in fact make it politically imperative for the intervening
state to be able to claim some degree of self-interest in the interven-
tion, however altruistic its primary motive might actually be. Apart
from economic or strategic interests, that self-interest could, for ex-
ample, take the understandable form of a concern to avoid refugee
outflows, or a haven for drug producers or terrorists, developing in
one's neighbourhood. 130
B. DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO FREE CHOICE REPRESENTS
A REAL THREAT TO WORLD PEACE
World community indifference to electoral mal-practices in SSA over-
looks the potential threats posed to international peace and security. Ex-
amples from SSA where elections results have been contested by public
opinion, opposition parties, and civil society underscore how the failure
to preempt and prevent such abuses could easily lead to a messy conflict
with spillover effects. Several consequences flow from popular contesta-
tions of the legitimacy of the polls and could include withdrawal of mass
confidence and support in the electoral system and ultimately the central
government itself. This withdrawal can be expressed in peaceful nonvio-
lent ways. For instance, people can simply refuse to take part in future
elections which they dismiss as nothing but state organized charades. It
could also express itself in overt and violent confrontations with central
authority.131
The four-year old crisis in the Ivory Coast is a case in point. Persistent
and widespread complaints about the fairness and transparency of past
elections went ignored until they reached a boiling point. 132 First, during
129. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 56, at 39, 4.36.
130. Id. at 39, $ 4.35.
131. Contested elections in the Congo Republic ended up in a destructed rebellion
which split the country into war zones controlled by warlords, the Ninjas under the
command of the former mayor of Brazzaville, Kolelas, and the Cobras led by Sas-
sou-Nguesso, current president. In Cameroon, repeated electoral mal-practices
have contributed to a home-grown secessionist movement, the Southern Came-
roons National Council, which seeks to take the English-speaking section out of
the present union. The troubles in Congo were not localized but had trans-bound-
ary consequences; the secessionist impulse in Cameroon will likely spill into neigh-
boring Nigeria where groups like the Ogoni and the Efiks are also asserting their
right to self-determination.
132. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN PRACTICES
2002: COTE D'IvoIRE, section 3 (Mar. 31, 2003), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2002/index.htm.
FREE CHOICE IN THE THIRD WORLD
the presidential election of October 2001, a serious contender, Alassane
Ouattara, a former Prime Minister of the Ivory Coast, was stripped of his
Ivorian citizenship, which disqualified him from being a candidate in that
election.1 33 Then the elections to the National Assembly in July 2002 saw
supporters of Ouattara's party, the Rally of the Republic (RDR), drawn
mainly from the Muslim north, systematically denied voting cards on ac-
count of their ethnicity and presumed sympathy for Ouattara. These de-
liberate and systematic attempts to subvert the electoral system
immensely contributed to a full-blown civil war pitting a largely Muslim
north against a predominantly Christian south, from whence the current
President Laurent Gbagbo hails.
The specter of a once stable Ivory Coast, cleaved into two antagonistic
parts caught in a savage fratricidal war with the potential of endangering
the stability of the region, has not been lost on African statesmen. In the
early stages of the conflict, President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, in
unusual candor for an African leader, acknowledged that "[a] threat to
Ivory Coast is a threat to all of us. ' '134 Among his many worries must
have been the steady stream of refugees from both sides of the north/
south divide ending up in the six countries that share boundaries with the
Ivory Coast: Mali, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Burkina
Faso.135 This new flow of displaced persons only added to an earlier mas-
sive displacement of hundreds of thousands of people fleeing from the
civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 136 The Ivorian crisis, which has its
roots in a democratization process gone awry, could have been
avoided-and this point bears emphasizing-but for the lack of interna-
tional will.
Doing nothing in the Ivory Coast may have contributed to the present
crisis. The Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty takes the
position that the international responsibility to protect also implies a con-
comitant responsibility to prevent, noting that "[t]he failure of prevention
133. The Constitution was amended shortly before the election and contained a new
provision requiring all presidential candidates to be Ivorian nationals born of par-
ents who are themselves both Ivorians. The Constitution also rules out anyone
who has ever held another nationality. Ouattara was disqualified on the alleged
ground that he is a national of Burkina Faso.
134. See Briony Hale, Ivorian Unrest Threatens West Africa Economy, BBC NEWS, Oct.
1, 2002, http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2288938.stm.
135. At the outset of the conflict, the U.N. food agency, the World Food Program
(WFP) warned of a humanitarian crisis in Ivory Coast on a scale comparable to the
crisis in the Great Lakes region where millions have died in conflicts in Rwanda,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Burundi. According to the WFP "[aill the
ingredients are present for a large-scale humanitarian crisis through a massive dis-
placement of people in the country and possible outflow of immigrant workers into
neighbouring countries." About 200,000 people have been displaced. See Ivory
Coast Defence Minister Axed, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/africa/
2323577.stm.
136. It is estimated that 400,000 Ivorian residents were forced to flee to neighboring
countries as a result of the crisis: of this number 95,000 fled to Liberia, 85,000
entered Guinea adding to an already 104,000 refugees who had earlier fled the civil
wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s. An additional 800,000 persons were
displaced within the Ivory Coast. Available at http://www.unrec.org/cote-ivoire.
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can have wide international consequences and costs. ' 137 The collapse of
the Ivorian State would have entailed unimaginable consequences and
costs. To begin with, the disintegration or balkanization of the Ivory
Coast represents a threat to regional stability that could ultimately en-
danger international peace and security. As the civil war raged on, it trig-
gered an arms race in this corner of the globe as the belligerents
aggressively entered the international arms market in search of weapons
to destroy each other. The government admitted to spending more than
$1 billion to purchase arms from private companies in Angola. President
Gbagbo conceded this much in response to rebel accusation that foreign
soldiers had been imported from Angola to reinforce government troops:
"We bought weapons and ammunition in Angola at the beginning of the
crisis, we paid for them, and they are now arriving. 138
In addition to involving Angola through arms purchases, the Gbagbo
government also imported mercenaries from South Africa to help contain
rebel forces holding most of the country's north.139 As if that was not
enough, a 1,300 strong West African force would later be deployed in the
Ivory Coast several months into the conflict for peace-keeping duties.
They were to replace the 3,800 French troops who were flown in the early
days of the conflict to ensure the security of French and other Western
nationals. These foreign troops are still quartered in the Ivory Coast.
Here then is a crisis that began its life as a purely localized affair eventu-
ally snowballing into an international conflict as it slowly but surely
sucked in other countries into its dragnet.
Secondly, it would have been economically beneficial for the global
community to have funded the organization of free and transparent elec-
tions. The funds that will now be used to rebuild a collapsing or collapsed
Ivorian State 140 are likely to outstrip the cost of repairing the flawed elec-
137. ICISS REPORT, supra note 56, 3.3. The international efforts to comply with this
responsibility to prevent are not unidirectional: they can take the form of induce-
ments in some cases or tough measures including punitive measures in others. Id.
See also Yogesh K. Tyagi, The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention Revisited, 16
MICH. J. INT'L L. 883 (1995) (where the author argues that once a humanitarian
crisis breaks out, it is difficult to control, so instead of providing relief to refugees
it is better to arrest situations that create refugees).
138. See Ivorian Rebels Meet Mediators, BBC NEWS, available at http://www.news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/world/africa/2335745.stm.
139. See Reuters, Pro-Government Mercenaries Reported in Ivory Coast, http://story.
news.yahoo.com/news; Ivorians Confirm Mercenary Presence, BBC NEWS, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/2449049.stm.
140. An accord on the cessation of hostilities and an acceptance of a dialogue was
brokered by the Senegalese Foreign Minister on behalf of the ECOWAS (Eco-
nomic Community of West African States) presidency which was then held by Se-
negal. This accord was signed on October 17, 2002. Shortly thereafter, President
Gbagbo declared his willingness to enter into direct negotiations with the insur-
gents (who occupied the whole of northern Ivory Coast as well as parts of the
west). The cease-fire agreement was followed by talks in Lome, Togo aimed at
finding a lasting solution to the Ivorian crisis. These talks began on October 30,
2002, under the auspices of the Togolese President, Gnassingbe Eyadema, who was
acting as the coordinator of the ECOWAS Contact Group. This encounter be-
tween the Government and members of the Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast
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toral system in the first place. Reforms would have helped inspire confi-
dence among a cross-section of the Ivorian population, Christian as well
as Muslim, now bent on killing each other. Ivory Coast is the world's
largest cocoa producer attracting a large number of migrant workers on
the cocoa and tropical fruits' plantations. With a $10 billion economy
(four times the size of its neighbors of Mali and Burkina Faso), a sizeable
services industry and a regional hub for banking, insurance, and advertis-
ing, the Ivory Coast was able to provide an environment where an esti-
mated five million non-Ivorian Africans could find gainful
employment.1 41 If this economy is destroyed as a result of the current
crisis, it will not be easy to rebuild. More importantly, the scarce re-
sources that would be earmarked for economic reconstruction would
most likely be diverted from resources that should be directed at resolv-
ing Africa's perennial problems, those scourges that continue to plague
this region: poverty, HIV/AIDS, malaria, river blindness, environmental
degradation, and so on.
(PMIC) resulted in the signing of a joint communique on November 1, 2002, which
addressed the major claims of the rebels. The promised direct negotiations be-
tween President Gbagbo and the insurgents took place in the French resort town
of Linas-Marcoussis from January 15-23, 2003. Also taking part in these talks were
representatives from Alassane Ouattara's Rally of the Republic (RDR) which
draws support from the Muslim north, and the PDCI of former Ivorian President
Konan Bedie. The Marcoussis Agreement hammered out in nearly two weeks of
negotiations provided inter alia for a government of national reconciliation that
would include all the parties in the conflict, the appointment of a Prime Minister
acceptable to all sides, and the amendment of article 35 of the Constitution which
sets forth eligibility requirements for the presidency. This provision is widely be-
lieved to have been written into the constitution with the specific goal of eliminat-
ing Ouattara as a contender for the presidency. The insurgents listed this
gerrymandering of the Ivorian Constitution as one of numerous examples of dis-
crimination Northerners were forced to endure in their own country. Ouattara is a
Muslim from the north. Available at http://www.unrec.org/cote-ivoire. A confer-
ence of African Heads of States met in Paris from January 25-26, 2003, convened
and chaired by French President Jacques Chirac, to witness the official acceptance
of the Marcoussis Agreement by Ivory Coast's President Laurent Gbagbo. The
agreement was subsequently endorsed by the U.N. Security Council, S.C. Res.
1464, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1464 (Feb. 4, 2003) (welcoming the deployment of
ECOWAS and French troops and calling for full implementation of the Marcoussis
Agreement). The Security Council resolution was prompted by the reluctance of
President Gbagbo and his FPI (Front populaire ivoirien) supporters to accept the
terms of the bargain the former had agreed to in France.
All is still not well with the Ivory Coast; the process of national reconciliation
still has a long way to go. In September 2003, members of the Patriotic Movement
of Cote d'Ivoire withdrew from the government of national reconciliation accusing
President Gbagbo of foot dragging in implementing the Marcoussis Agreement.
Shortly thereafter the U.S. State Department issued a statement urging the New
Forces ministers to resume their participation in the government. The statement
also appealed to President Gbabgo and the other parties to follow through on "the
Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintergration process that the Linas-Marcous-
sis reforms for free, transparent election in 2005 can be implemented." See State
Department Urges Cote d'lvoire to Resume Peace Talks, Sept. 28, 2003, http://all
africa.com/stories/; Chinyere Amalu, ECOWAS Urges Ivorian Rebels to Return to
Government, Vanguard (Lagos), Sept. 26, 2003, http://allafrica.com/stories/.
141. See Hale, supra note 134.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The propriety of external involvement in the domestic affairs of states
in defense of the peoples' right to freely choose whom they want to gov-
ern them has been the focus of this essay; the disparate global community
response to systematic and persistent abuses of this fundamental right
was a sub-theme. Thus, the interest in human rights in this essay was
specifically limited to the enjoyment of the right to democratic govern-
ance and the obligation of the international community to vindicate or
secure this legal right.142 The focus is on SSA where "[a] decade of de-
mocratization has resulted in disappointing results and unfulfilled expec-
tations, frustrating the democratic promise of peace and
development. "143
With due apologies to the relativists, this essay takes as a given that the
human rights contained in the International Bill of Rights were meant to
be universally enjoyed. Among the fundamental rights people in SSA are
yearning to enjoy is the right to live under a democratic form of govern-
ment. A key component of this democratic entitlement is the right to
political participation. Agreement is fairly widespread that the means to
give expression to this right is through periodic and genuine elections.
The centrality of the right to participation in legitimizing governance im-
poses an affirmative duty on the community of nations to safeguard and
deepen this right in regions where its observance is more in the breach.
In SSA, popular expectations that elections to democratically choose a
government will be free and fair have not been borne out in practice. The
reality has been one of widespread, persistent, and systematic violations
of this fundamental right. This reality then raises the question whether
the best approach to restoring this right is through external unilateral or
multilateral action. The position taken here is that the form of external
response is not as critical as the effort made to treat comparable cases of
violations of this right in like manner. That is, consistency and equality of
treatment should be the hallmark of any form of external response,
whether unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral, to human rights abuses
wherever these have occurred. Such a response should be seen as bal-
anced and evenhanded in order for it to be well-received by the victims of
those abuses. An external response should not be driven primarily and
exclusively by the external actor's own narrow national and strategic geo-
political interests, but must be fully committed to democratic restoration
as the ultimate goal. It is such commitment that guarantees a sustainable
response without which success in the restorative quest is not guaranteed.
142. See Christina M. Cerna, Universal Democracy: An International Legal Right or the
Pipe Dream of the West?, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 289, 299 (1995) (arguing
that the right to live under a democratic form of government has become an inter-
national legal right).
143. See LOADA & SANTISO, supra note 9.
